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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to trace the development of the
French auditing profession, the commissaires aux comptes, focusing
on the appearance of the large Anglo-American audit firms on the
French market. The French audit market has always shown a number
of peculiarities, including the continued importance of a number of
local audit firms. The French auditing profession finds its roots in late
19th century company law that introduced an obligation for companies to release audited financial statements. The profession became
regulated in its modern form in the 1960s. This paper attempts to
explain the growing impact of the international audit firms on the
French auditing profession. It also demonstrates how local professionals and the French state reacted to these developments.

Introduction
Most European audit markets have witnessed significant
changes over recent decades. A striking development that has
elicited academic curiosity is the growing impact of the large
Anglo-American audit firms on local audit markets. The development of audit markets has been well studied in many venues,
generally from an economic perspective using contracting
theory as the framework for the analysis of developments in
the supply of audit services [e.g., Watts and Zimmerman, 1983;
Craswell et al., 1995; Holmes and Zimmer, 1998]. The existence
of large accounting firms is partially explained by economies of
scale. Summarizing the relevant literature, Meuwissen [1999]
concluded that large audit firms obtain cost advantages and receive fee premiums, probably due to product differentiation.
Acknowledgments: The authors thank the CERAG Grenoble for its editing
support and the referees for their helpful comments.
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Part of this research focuses on audit-market concentration
as the largest international firms have declined in number from
the “Big Eight” to the now “Fat Four,” expanding their market
shares in the process [Pigé, 2003; Ramirez, 2003]. One of the
first studies in this area was Zeff and Fossum [1967], followed
by others that also focused on the U.S. Moizer [1992] observed
how European research lagged behind, that little academic work
was done in the area of the European audit-services market in
Europe previous to 1992.
Eventually audit-market structures were studied in, among
others, the U.K. [Moizer and Turley, 1987], The Netherlands
[Buijink and Maijoor, 1991], Denmark [Christiansen and Loft,
1992], Belgium [Weets and Jegers, 1997], and Sweden [Wallerstedt, 2001]. On the French market, Piot [2001] highlighted the
barriers to competition between different categories of audit
firms (the “Big Six,” large national firms, and local audit firms)
on the basis of the characteristics of their client portfolios.
Gonthier-Besacier and Moizer [2001] focused on the current
perception of audit firms in France and found no significant differences between the “Big Five” and large local firms.
Most of the studies mentioned center on an analysis of empirical data relating to audit clients, fees, or number of professionals. Our objective, however, is to understand how and why
the large Anglo-American firms became dominant in France,
as in most other countries. The issue is worth pondering. Many
consider France to be a country that vigorously defends its own
culture, language, and modes of organization. The progressive
introduction of the international firms means either that the
French abandoned their traditional positions or that the international firms adapted to the French culture, language, audit
approach, etc. These issues are explored in this paper.
Literature review and research questions
The research question of this paper relates to the entry and
strategies of the Anglo-American audit firms in France. The
literature on multinational firms distinguishes different modes
of foreign entry. Anderson and Gatignon [1986] classified modes
of entry based on the degree of control afforded the entrant.
The highest degree of control is characterized by dominant equity interests, such as majority shareholdings. Medium-control
modes include joint ventures and contractual arrangements and
franchises. Low-control modes are typically non-exclusive contracts and minority shareholdings. Chan Kim and Hwang [1992]
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/4
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demonstrate that entry-mode decisions are not only influenced
by environmental and transaction-specific factors, but also by
the global strategy of the multinational enterprise involved.
Agarwal and Ramaswami [1992] consider ownership, location,
and internalization advantages as factors that have an impact on
entry-mode choice. To compete with local firms, foreign entrants
must have superior assets and skills. These depend on firm size
and the ability to develop differentiated products. The market
potential and investment risk in the host country have an impact on both the decision to enter and the mode of entry. The
strength of competition from local firms also influences entry
strategy [Buckley and Casson, 1998].
The audit industry is a service industry. Much of the litera
ture on multinational firms focuses on manufacturing enter
prises and the debate over whether their conventions are applicable to service industries [Ekeledo and Sivakumar, 1998].
Because of the people-intensive nature of services, the entrymode choices of service multinationals are more influenced by
behavioral uncertainties, trust propensity, and asset specificity.
Similar choices in manufacturing firms depend more on environmental uncertainties and risk propensity [Brouthers et al.,
2002; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003]. Sarathy [1994] concluded
that the internationalization strategies in service industries are
quite distinctive. They prefer direct modes of entry into foreign
markets, through foreign investment and acquisitions, often
with a local partner. High fixed costs and government regulations that favor local firms may deter service businesses from entering smaller markets. In such industries, implementing a unified strategy across different countries is a significant challenge.
Bouquet et al. [2004] found that in industries where there is
close interaction with end customers and where extensive levels
of professional skills, specialized know-how, and customization
are involved, there is a preference for wholly owned subsidiaries
and expatriate staff. In business services such as accountancy,
internalization and equity-based, foreign direct investment are
the preferred modes for exploiting ownership advantages [Boddewyn et al., 1986]. These characteristics made it necessary to
adjust the traditional transaction-cost framework used to study
entry-mode choice [Erramilli and Rao, 1993].
Kipping [1999] studied the expansion of U.S. managementconsulting companies to Western Europe in the 20th century. He
concludes that the long-term success of consulting companies
depends on the establishment of successful external (client) and
internal (partner) networks. The success of U.S. consultancies
Published by eGrove, 2009
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was linked with the aura of professionalism of U.S. industry
and with the expansion of U.S. companies to Europe acting as a
bridging function.
Previous research on the French accounting and auditing
profession focuses on the development of associations of accountants in France between 1880 and the 1940s [Bocqueraz,
2000, 2001] and on the sociology of the accounting profession
between 1920 and 1939 [Ramirez, 2001]. Ramirez [2003] relates
the evolution of French auditors since 1970, as well as the role
of the Anglo-American audit firms. He concludes that the success of these firms is due to their integration with the French
elite and to the lack of adaptation of the traditional professional
model to changes in the market.
RESEARCH METHOD
This paper is based on the analysis of a broad series of
documents and archives, as well as on a series of interviews.
These documents and archives have rarely been investigated.
They consist of reports on the meetings of the Conseil Supérieur
de l’Ordre des Experts-Comptables (CSOEC, National Council of
the Institute of Public Accountants) from 1960, reports on meetings of the Conseil National de la Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (CNCC, National Council of the National
Association of Statutory Auditors) from 1970, and the archives
of the Institut Français des Experts-Comptables (IFEC, French
Institute of Public Accountants), a major trade union for French
accountants from 1964.
The interviews provided information that was not found in
any other source, as is often the case with oral history. The interviewees were selected on the basis of the role they played during
the period studied and their functions in the audit profession.
They include key players from the 1970s and 1980s – former
presidents and directors of professional bodies, leading partners
in international and local firms, and members of oversight bodies. The list of those interviewed can be found in Appendix A. All
interviews took place in June and July 2002, and were attended
by two of the authors. They were not taped, but extensive notes
were taken and a report written by one author and checked by
the other as close as possible to the interview date.
the French auditing profession
The traditional audit function in France originated from
company-law regulations in the third quarter of the 19th cenhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/4
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tury. Although oversight functions on behalf of the shareholders
existed occasionally before 1863, the law of May 23, 1863 on
limited companies introduced the statutory audit (the commissariat) in limited-liability companies. Article 15 of the 1863 law
stated that the general assembly of shareholders had to elect one
or more commissaires (auditors) who were required to submit
a report on the situation of the company, its balance sheet, and
the accounts presented by the directors. The auditor was called
commissaire des comptes (auditor of the accounts), commissaire
de surveillance (supervisor), or censeur (censor) [Houpin and
Bosvieux, 1935, p. 291]. The 1863 law saw the commissaire as a
company entity, similar to the board of directors, but with the
task of auditing the books and analyzing the activities of the
company [Foyer, 1971, p. 195]. As in other countries with similar systems, this auditing regulation was strongly criticized due
to the lack of independence and competency regulations [Mikol,
1993, p. 4]. Shareholders, relatives of directors, or employees
of the company were all eligible as auditors [Girardet, 1927, p.
104].
In 1935, the role of the auditor was clarified and his in
dependence strengthened [Salato and Ghez, 1960, p. 25; Dupuis,
1967, p. 97; Mikol, 1993, p. 9]. A decree was issued on August
8, 1935, during an era of financial speculation and parliamentary corruption [Faure, 1929, p. 13]. It became impossible
for directors, employees, or their relatives to serve as auditors.
The provision of non-audit services to audit clients was not
allowed; auditors could not receive any fees apart from an audit
fee. They could only become directors after a five-year coolingdown period. The auditors had a mandate for three years and
could not be terminated before the end of term. Other 1935
innovations included professional secrecy and the obligation
to report illegal acts to the legal authorities [Kovarik, 1965]. In
public companies, the position of auditors was further strengthened by introducing the requirement that at least one of them
had to be chosen from a list of qualified auditors selected by the
Courts of Appeal after an examination. But the function of commissaire was not restricted to specific professionals; most were
experts-comptables (accountants), conseillers juridiques (legal
advisers), or well-respected citizens. There was no specific auditing profession1; most of the commissaires had no accounting
1
Private initiatives to organize accountants include the Compagnie des Experts-Comptables de Paris, born in 1912. In 1927, the Ministry of Education created a state-recognized certificate for accountants [Mikol, 1993, p. 5]. After World
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background [interview 2].
As late as 1967, external auditing was often considered
ineffective [Chaput, 1990, p. 28]. Eventually, the auditing profession was comprehensively organized with the August 12, 1969
decree. This decree included a definition of the objectives of
an audit and requirements with respect to entry examinations,
independence, and professional secrecy.2 It led to the creation
of the Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes
(CNCC), a national body under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Justice, contrary to the OECCA, the accountants’ professional
body, which was linked to the Finance Ministry. Before this,
there existed only regional Compagnies des Commissaires aux
Comptes in each Court of Appeal district. They assembled in a
federation, but this federation was not a real professional body
under the authority and/or control of a ministry [interview 10].
One of our interviewees suggested that the creation of the CNCC
was an attempt to create a more homogeneous body of experts,
in contrast to the OECCA, whose membership was, by and large,
considered incapable of performing audits [interview 3]. In fact,
the OECCA complained that the state did not recognize the economic role that its members could play and, at the same time,
War II, the only profession that was organized on a legal basis was the accounting
profession for whom an Ordre des Experts Comptables et des Comptables Agréés
(OECCA) was created in 1942 [Salato and Ghez, 1960, p. 24]. Apart from the
legally based OECCA, there were many associations for accountants and bookkeepers. (For a discussion of the development of the French accounting profession between the two World Wars, see Ramirez, 2001.) Although organized in the
same body, the experts-comptables were opposed to the existing comptables agréés,
a second-tier profession with little recognition. Interest in auditing was generally limited. Among the experts-comptables, the most advanced professionals were
those working for judicial expertises. In fact, “most members of this profession
were not involved in auditing” [interview 1].
2
The reform was prepared following the 1961 and 1962 OECCA congresses.
The 1961 congress had been dedicated to standards on auditing and the definition
of auditing, although this word was never used as such [interview 1]. Although
almost no Anglo-American auditing firms or auditors were active in France at the
time, the working parties of the OECCA who prepared the reform were strongly
influenced by the methods and standards of such auditing firms and included a
partner of Arthur Andersen France [interviews 1 and 2]. At that time, the only
French firm that had formalized working standards was the Fiduciaire de France,
possibly also the Fiduciaire de l’Est [interview 2]. One of the consequences of this
lack of French practice was that the organization of the audit profession was to
be based on the Anglo-American model. The draft company code of 1966 stressed
that the auditors should “obtain the competency, independence, and prestige of
the auditors of the Institutes of Chartered Accountants in the U.K., the members of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants or the German
Wirtschaftprüfer” [Law Proposal 1003, May 6, 1965, Journal Officiel].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/4
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admitted being troubled by the tendency of the state to interfere
in its internal problems [National Assembly, meeting on November 22, 1967, Journal Officiel, May 28, 1968, p. 773]. Because a
significant percentage of the OECCA’s members were at the same
time commissaire aux comptes [Scheid, 2000; Bocqueraz, 2001],
it is not surprising to find that it was common for the CNCC
president to have held leadership positions in the OECCA. The
OECCA and the bodies representing the commissaires also cooperated on a number of occasions.3
The first presence of the Anglo-American accounting firms
in France probably should be understood from a transactioncost theory perspective [Boddewyn et al., 1986]. By offering services in multiple locations, these accounting firms allowed their
clients to reduce their international transaction costs. In other
words, the auditors followed their clients. The historical sections of Anglo-American audit firms’ websites reveal that some
of them arrived quite early on the French market. At least one
was already present in Paris before 1914, due to the presence of
American oil companies [interview 3]. Price Waterhouse established its Paris office in 1916. In 1960, it became the firm’s major
European office, with eight Anglo-American partners. Cooper
Brothers, through its Belgian office, opened a Paris office in
1929. Due to the merger with Lybrand, Ross Bros & Montgomery in 1957, the Paris office became the first in the world to
bear the name “Coopers and Lybrand.” An Arthur Young office
was established in 1929. Andersen came rather late to France
in 1952, becoming a full-member firm only by 1970. Until the
end of the 1960s, it seems that the partners of these Paris offices
were all Anglo-American; Price Waterhouse, for example, had its
first two French partners only in 1969.
Although some of them were present early on, their impact
on the French market was originally rather symbolic. They
worked only with Anglo-American clients and their offices were
small. The Price Waterhouse office in Paris, for example, em3
For example, the general report presented at the 25th OECCA congress in
1970 was prepared by a working party consisting of OECCA representatives, the
Institut Français des Experts Comptables (a major trade union group among accountants), the Institut National des Syndicats et Associations d’Experts Compt
ables et de Comptables Agréés (a secondary trade union among accountants), the
Fédération des Associations de Commissaires de Sociétés inscrits (which became,
in 1970, the Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes and still exists
today) and the Compagnie des Commissaires de Sociétés Agréés par la Cour d’Appel
de Paris (which, in 1970, became the Compagnie Régionale des Commissaires aux
Comptes de Paris, still in existence) [OECCA, 1971, p. 2].
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ployed less than 300 persons in 1975 [interview 1]. They do not
seem to have been involved in statutory auditing before the end
of the 1970s. To them, statutory auditing was apparently a legal
formality, left to French professionals. One former president of
the OECCA remembers that there were no Anglo-Americans at
the beginning to assume the role of legal auditor (commissaire
aux comptes) in French firms, nor were French professionals
involved in contractual, non- compulsory audits for Anglo-American clients [interview 2]. This resulted in a clear market segmentation up to the 1970s; the international firms were involved
in contractual audits or consulting services for subsidiaries of
international companies [interview 3], whereas only French
firms dealt with statutory auditing, which the Anglo-Americans
viewed as “complicated, dangerous and difficult to understand”
as it had a fundamentally legal consonance [interview 3].
In 1971, 5,171 commissaires were registered by the CNCC.
Ninety-one percent of these worked as sole practitioners, and
87% spent less than half of their time on statutory audits [Bennecib, 2002]. Positions were not equally distributed; only 4.5%
of auditors held at least 50 positions as statutory auditors.
Eighty-four firms acted as statutory auditor for 80% of all listed
companies. The vast majority of French professionals were
sole practitioners who ran their offices in a very “traditional”
way – no engagement letters, no analysis of internal control
procedures, no confirmations, no physical inventories, etc.4 One
of their major weaknesses was their dispersion. This situation
was further complicated by the heterogeneity of the French
profession. Not only was it divided between the OECCA and the
4
Quite early on, the accounting profession attempted to educate its members
in the field of auditing. As early as 1965, the 20th OECCA congress resulted in the
publication of a textbook, Auditing: Theory and Practice of the Control of Financial Statements, highlighting the state of the art in auditing financial statements
[OECCA, 1965]. This textbook was distributed among its members in an attempt
to improve practice. Contemporary audit methods seem to have been known in
France in the 1960s and 1970s, even though they were not used by the vast majority of French practitioners. In fact, even in 1970, the OECCA summed up a number
of techniques that were not often used in French auditing – evaluation of internal
controls, establishment of an audit program and extensive working papers, statistical sampling methods, and direct confirmations of account balances [OECCA,
1971, p. 3]. The professional body also tried to have an impact on education. In
this area, there were initiatives by the profession and higher education institutions, especially in the area of audit education. Up to 1970, accounting was barely
taught at universities, but before that year, it was already part of the programs
offered in vocational schools and in a growing number of Grandes Ecoles business
schools [Casta and Mikol, 1999].
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CNCC, but also within the major bodies, there were tensions between comptables agréés and experts-comptables [Mikol, 2004, p.
9]. International audit firms, on the other hand, had aggressive
growth strategies. They were constantly looking for alliances
and strategies that could give them a competitive advantage
[Stevens, 1991].
In the 1970s, all of the “Big Eight” international accounting
firms were present in France [Bennecib, 2002]. Their French
offices were legal entities according to French law, registered
with the OECCA. At that time, their majority shareholders were
either French citizens registered as experts-comptables or commissaires aux comptes, or foreign nationals having resident status in France with the same professional qualification [Colasse
and Pavé, 2005]. The arrangements within the international networks of firms were diverse. Generally, they were partnerships.
In some, there was a centralized structure with branches in
different countries. In others, there was a more federal structure
where the local firms had exclusive rights to use the brand name
and where contractual arrangements between the international
and the national levels included an obligation to train staff according to a defined methodology and to collaborate with other
network firms, as well as potentially receiving sanctions if a local
firm abandoned the network.
The Aubin report [1982, §64], a major governmental report
on the status of the profession, summarized the situation at
the end of the 1970s as follows: “The atomization of practices
that damages the coherency and quality of their services; the
increasing power of the Anglo-American practices, supported by
a clear strategy of market entry and massive resources.” In such
circumstances, conflicts between the different sectors of the profession became unavoidable.
FRANCE AND INTERNATIONALIZATION
Internationalization strategies of companies are strongly
influenced by institutional factors. Decisions on entry modes
are influenced by attempts to gain legitimacy from internal and
external claimants. Yiu and Makino [2002, p. 667] argue that
“choices of foreign entry mode are significantly influenced by
isomorphic pressures embedded in foreign national environments.” Multinational firms face pressure to conform to the
standards and values of the host country and to the practices
within the multinational enterprise. Their behavior is influenced
by regulative, normative, and cognitive aspects of the instituPublished by eGrove, 2009
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tional environment. Institutional distance refers to the extent of
dissimilarity between host and home institutions [Xu and Shenkar, 2002]. A large institutional distance hinders the transfer of
organizational practice from the parent to the foreign subsidiary.
This is relevant for this paper as the culture of the international
audit firms was mainly U.S.-based, which might have made entry into France more difficult.
The attitude of France with respect to U.S. business innovations has been analyzed comprehensively by Djelic [1998].
This section summarizes some of the key developments that
she identified. Before World War II, France was a country of
small companies; large firms were concentrated in only a few
industries, such as mining or iron and steel. French firms were
typically individual or family-owned. Private limited companies
and partnerships were far more popular than public companies.
In France, little trace could be found of the managerial revolution that changed much of the U.S. industrial structure at the
same time. In fact, developments in the U.S. were generally met
with fear and dismay and were considered incompatible with
the French economic and social order. World War II changed
this pattern significantly. France emerged from the war as a
weak and divided nation. Large parts of the population questioned existing traditions and institutions. A dynamic economic
system came to be seen as a basis for geopolitical power. The
examples of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. became attractive for
their emergence as great powers that relied on innovative and
growing economies. Following the war, cross-national networks were created linking small groups of powerful French
technocrats and progressive Americans, generally associated with the Marshall plan. Examples include Jean Monnet,
Pierre Mendès-France, and the newly founded Ecole Nationale
d’Administration. They started a modernization process of
French industry to increase productivity, often with the American economy and U.S. managerial knowledge and methods as
references.
This context made the introduction and growth of the AngloAmerican auditing firms in France easier. Our respondents indicated that the Anglo-American firms enjoyed a young, modern,
dynamic, and competent image. This positive image was felt to
affect the company managers who hired these firms as auditors.
They had a good reputation due to their methodological advantage [interview 2]. They were seen as “modern and chic” [interview 3]. This view was confirmed in the professional journals:
“We also observe a growing fad for Anglo-American techniques”
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/4
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[L’Expert-Comptable de Demain, May 1982, p. 18].
The international firms had a stronger financial position
than French professionals because they were really firms rather
than loose groupings of professionals [interview 2]. Due to their
stronger financial position, they were able to take over attractive clients from retiring French professionals [interview 6].
It seems that they also could charge higher fees (the ratio was
from 1 to 100 compared to a French firm, according to interview
2, based on a certain kind of “snobbism at a time of prosperity”
[interview 3]. Contrary to this, one of our respondents indicated
that the Anglo-Americans “low balled on audit fees to get an introduction to a client, and then made money out of consulting”
[interview 5]. However, this is difficult to confirm because audit
and non-audit fees were not disclosed in France until recently.
Anyway, higher fees would be consistent with the observation
in the literature that “multinational firms should have superior assets and skills that can earn economic rents that are high
enough to counter the higher cost of servicing these markets”
[Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992, p. 4].
International firms were well-organized, focusing on audit
methodology and efficient use of staff. Previous research demonstrates that most traditional French commissaires approached
the verification of financial statements from a narrow, legalistic
perspective [Ramirez, 2001]. The international firms, on the
other hand, adopted a more modern and comprehensive approach. It was well known that there was a large gap between
French audit practices and those in the Anglo-American and
Germanic countries [Law Proposal 1003, June 20, 1964, p. 696].
The professional competency of the Anglo-American firms was
undeniable [interviews 5, 6, and 9], and they used tools that the
French auditors did not have [interview 6]. The only exception
seems to be the Fiduciaire de France which remained an innovative firm until the 1980s [interview 8]. The international firms
were perceived to be more serious [interview 2] and provided
their clients with the presence of numerous assistants, making
their work visible and valuable. Their files were full of working
papers, which was not always the case for French firms [interview 6]. From a methodological point of view, they had an edge
over most French professionals [interviews 2 and 3] and guaranteed the quality of a homogeneous service [interview 3]. The
Anglo-American firms demonstrated their methodology also to a
broader audience.
The increasing internationalization of French companies
from the 1980s onwards further strengthened the position of
Published by eGrove, 2009
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the Anglo-American audit firms.5 French audit firms apparently
could not offer overseas services to the same extent, and their
names were not recognized abroad [Casta and Mikol, 1999, p.
114]. Although some French firms tried to establish networks
of correspondents (e.g., Salustro and DFK in 1966), the AngloAmerican networks proved much stronger because they were
more integrated and had existed for a longer time [interview 2].
French firms definitely suffered from a competitive disadvantage
because the major positions, e.g., in the U.S. market, were already taken by home-based firms there [interview 3]. Using the
signature of international audit firms allowed French companies
to gain recognition abroad [interviews 6 and 7].
The international firms also offered a broader range of
services. In France, the market for non-audit services was
completely open. During the 1970s and 1980s, the local audit
firms had “nothing else to sell but accounting or taxation consultancy,” with the exception of Fiduciaire de France, which also
offered legal expertise. International firms systematically sold a
broad range of services [interview 6], including computer services (a key area for Arthur Andersen according to interview 3),
tax consulting, recruitment consultancy, corporate finance, and
environmental consulting. Their competence was overwhelming
in the field of “real consulting, that is, one that leads to setting
procedures and information systems,” and which allows the sale
of thousands of hours of services [interview 5]. Often they got a
foothold in companies by offering tax services, especially those
related to international tax issues, and then extended their involvement [interview 7]. The timing of their large-scale introduction to the French market coincided with the prevalence of huge
opportunities in this area. They also provided specialist services,
such as consolidation. French professionals were unfamiliar
with group accounts. The term “consolidation” does not appear
in the 1957 Chart of Accounts (Plan Comptable), neither does it
appear in accounting teaching curricula nor in the July 24, 1966
law on commercial firms [Casta and Mikol, 1999]. Although the
first consolidated statements predate 1968, the practice was not
widespread, and reports were prepared without legal or professional rules [OECCA, 1971, pp. 133-159]. The Anglo-American
firms immediately dominated this part of the market; large
groups, such as Saint Gobain, depended strongly on international audit firms, in part because their consolidated statements
5
Of the capital of French companies listed on the Paris Stock Exchange,
37.5% was owned by foreign investors as of 2000 [Le Monde, 2001, p. 22].
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generally adopted American accounting standards. Consolidated
financial statement regulations were eventually introduced into
the French law in 1985 [Touron, 2003].
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE INTERNATIONAL AUDIT FIRMS
The Reaction of the French Public Authorities: In 1982, Minister of Finance Jacques Delors commissioned Finance Inspector Christian Aubin [1982] to conduct an investigation into the
accounting profession. According to one of our interviewees
who personally participated in its elaboration, this study was
mandated by the profession itself [interview 3]. It suggested the
easing of regulation on the provision of non-audit services and
the creation of a new body of larger audit firms that would be
internationally recognized. The position of the French government was also expressed during the parliamentary debate: “The
objective of the government … is to facilitate the development of
French firms that have a professional level and a size that allows
them to offer quality services which are comparable to those of
their international competitors” [Senate Debates, November 20,
1982, Journal Officiel, p. 5,624].
The Aubin report was followed by an initiative by the minister of finance, approved by the minister of justice, who asked
Inspector General of Finance Philippe Huet to propose measures to strengthen the audit profession in France and to help it
in its international development. However, Mr. Huet concluded
in 1984, that it was only through joining worldwide audit firms
that French auditors would have their professional quality recognized internationally. Starting with such associations, French
firms could become famous and then continue on their own
[Aujourd’hui et Demain, No. 28, June 20, 1984].
All these reports suggest that the position of the French
State was to conclude that mergers within the accounting profession were unavoidable. Smaller firms apparently saw this
as an attempt to stimulate the creation of large audit firms, to
the detriment of small firms and sole practitioners, and blamed
the state for helping the Anglo-American firms. One of our respondents averred that the state has “done nothing to help the
French profession” and even “has an absolute responsibility”
for weakening the position of French professionals [interview
3]. The same message was communicated in the editorial of
L’Expert-Comptable de Demain [July 1983, p. 3]: “Mr Aubin concluded that, faced with competition and in order to be able to
invest in research, our profession is bound to merge … M. Aubin
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seems to think that great size is the necessary and sufficient condition for making a professional firm credible. This is not our
opinion.” This mistrust of the role of the state was already present among practitioners in the 1970s. As an example, Jacques
Secher said at the general meeting of the IFEC on November 4,
1972: ‘The main enemy are the Public Authorities and a number
of technocrats who want to abolish the professions, the medical
doctors, the barristers’ [cited in IFEC Informations Mensuelles,
November 1972, p. 31]. To some extent, this type of reaction reflected a development that goes beyond the world of accounting.
It represents a transformation from a profession focusing on
its institutional role to one in which business interests became
much more significant. During this period, French notaries,
architects, and doctors, confronted with similar changes, questioned their professional organizations.
The Role of the Commission des Opérations de Bourse: The Commission des Opérations de Bourse (COB)6 was created in 1967
to supervise the French capital market. It could have had a significant impact on the introduction of these international audit
firms since it ratified the appointment and renewal of statutory
auditors in listed companies. Although the COB did not have
any decision-making power, companies often asked its opinion
when audit mandates had to be renewed. Evidence with respect
to the role of the COB is contradictory. Generally, it increased
the demand for competent and independent auditors [interview
1]. Some of our respondents suggested that the COB had a list
of auditors that it recommended to companies desiring a listing [interviews 2 and 4]. This view was rejected by the former
head of accounting policy at the COB [interview 7]. For some,
the COB apparently preferred the French audit firms because
its contacts with such firms were easier and because it had
more impact on them [interview 2]. However, other respondents
stated the opposite, suggesting that the COB preferred the Anglo-American firms because they were more fashionable, more
competent, and/or more dynamic [interviews 3, 5, and 6]. Other
respondents said that the COB was not very concerned [interview 9] or that its position varied depending on the preferences
of its president [interview 4]. On balance, the COB on this issue
appears to have favored larger audit firms. It confirmed that the
certification of financial statements should be based on an audit
6 The COB is currently known as the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (Financial Markets Authority).

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/4

14

De Beelde et al.: Internationalizing the French auditing profession
De Beelde et al., French Auditing Profession

43

(une révision comptable) by commissaires with a team of assistants, carried out during the accounting period, and supported
by a permanent file, including an analysis of the internal control
system [Meary and Salustro, 1971, pp. 176-177]. This position
went contrary to the approach of the traditional French commissaire, who often worked individually [Ramirez, 2003]. There is
no factual evidence of a clear position taken by the COB. During
our interview, the former COB executive showed that French
audit firms audited 45% of the medium-sized firms listed on
the Second Market, created in 1987, and all of the companies
listed on the New Market, created for high-tech firms in 1997. In
conclusion, it is unclear which firms were favored by the COB,
and whether there was any systematic pattern in its preferences.
Its role should not be overestimated, in any case, because the
French stock market was only of secondary importance and
many large French companies were state-owned.
In the 1980s, the big Anglo-American firms came to dominate the whole of the French audit market, as shown in Table
1. Among 591 audit firms employing more than 20 persons in
France in 1983, only ten had more than 200 employees, representing one-third of the profession in terms of personnel.
Just nine of them audited 48.3% of French listed companies. A
decade later, audit firms with more than 50 staff employed only
1.3% of French auditors and accountants, but earned more than
29% of the total revenue of the profession in 1997 [Béthoux,
2001]. A number of local firms continued to audit listed companies, although the vast majority of companies on the stock
exchange were audited by international firms.
TABLE 1
French Audit Market in 1983
Panel A: Turnover of French Audit Firms in 1983,
French Francs, (000s omitted)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Audit Firm
Helios Streco Durando
Guy barbier et associés
De Bois Dieterlé et associés
Gufflet et Cie
Blanchard Chauveau et associés
Audit continental
Befec
Frinault Fiduciaire
SEEC Reydel Blanchot
Cabinet Mazars
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International Network
Arthur Young
Arthur Andersen
Touch Ross
Coopers et Lybrand
Price Waterhouse
Peat Marwick Mitchell
B.D.O.
K.M.G.
Dunwoody Robson
N/A

KF
186,000
115,000
95,700
90,000
85,000
73,000
72,000
69,800
58,000
52,000
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Panel B: Audit Firms with the Highest Number
of Listed Clients
Rank

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Audit Firm

International Network

Befec
Frinault Fiduciaire
De Bois Dieterlé et associés
Helios Streco Durando
SEEC Reydel Blanchot
Calan Ramolino
Castel Jacquet
Fiduciaire de France
Pavie et associés
Cauvin Angleys St Pierre

B.D.O.
K.M.G.
Touch Ross
Arthur Young
Dunwoody Robson
DHR International
N/A
KMG
N/A
Howard et Howard

Number
of Listed
Clients
155
121
108
100
58
53
50
51
51
39

Source: ATH, 1985

OPPOSITION AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL FIRMS
The Cultural Reaction: Following World War II, not everyone
in France was convinced of the need to modernize the French
economy. Part of the French business community has always
continued to defend its traditional positions against the modernizers [Djelic, 1998, p. 237]. French business associations were
divided with many of its members suspicious of the modernization project. Especially in smaller companies, there remained
strong support for traditional family capitalism in the 1950s.
This conservatism limited the potential growth of the AngloAmerican audit firms in France. In general, multinational corporations are hindered in their expansion if there are significant legal or cultural differences between home and the target country
[Xu and Shenkar, 2002]. The differences between France and the
Anglo-American countries, home to the large accounting firms,
were quite significant [Nobes and Parker, 2000].
A legalistic tradition is a major component of French society, leading to a “highly regulated position of statutory auditors”
[Piot, 2001, p. 463]. Specific French attributes, such as the strict
regulation of independence and requirements in corporate law
to issue specific reports to third parties, may have produced a
significant barrier to the entry of Anglo-American firms into the
auditing market. Another significant issue is the role of French
culture and its impact on the business community. Antinomies
between French and the Anglo-American cultural models made
the Anglo-American model ill-adapted to French behaviors
[d’Iribarne, 1985]. Traditional preferences for “French products”
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/4

16

De Beelde et al.: Internationalizing the French auditing profession
De Beelde et al., French Auditing Profession

45

also helped the French accounting firms, especially in small
companies (culture franchouillarde or “Frenchy culture”), as
one of our respondents put it [interview 2]. Those who resisted
the introduction of Anglo-American firms strengthened this
protectionist cultural attitude. Those cultural and regulatory
barriers appear to have been quite strong. As indicated before,
the Anglo-American firms originally established themselves with
non-French partners, illustrating the American preference for
majority ownership in foreign subsidiaries [Erramilli, 1995, p.
228]. It is probably also linked with their limited target market
(subsidiaries of foreign companies) and with the relatively small
number of French professionals who could meet their standards
in these early years. To overcome the limitations that this policy
placed upon their growth potential, their strategy adapted to
French culture and regulation and the international firms became rapidly “francisized.” They began to hire French professionals and promote them to the partner level; “they adapted
marvelously to the French environment by hiring French professionals very rapidly” [interview 5]. More generally speaking, it
suggests that these firms gradually adopted a strategy of licensing or franchising once a sufficient number of knowledgeable
professionals was present in the French market [Boddewyn et
al., 1986].
The Reaction of French Professional Bodies: As with other in
dustry associations, the professional accounting bodies defended
the interests of French professionals. The accounting activities
of foreigners were strictly regulated. Based on a September 1945
regulation, foreign professionals could be allowed to provide
accounting services in France. However, their number remained
quite limited.7 Our interviews suggest that official representatives of the profession often were against the development of
the large Anglo-American firms in the early 1970s [interview 2].
7
Some examples show these low numbers. Fifty-eight Swiss professionals and
ten professionals labeled as “refugees” joined the profession in 1959. The “refugees” probably came from former French colonies; they definitely were not AngloAmerican [Actes du CSOEC, February 10, 1960]. In 1960, 60 Swiss and 11 “refugees” [Actes du CSOEC, February 6, 1961] and in 1961, 60 Swiss, 17 “refugees,”and
4 professionals from Morocco were accepted as members [Actes du CSOEC, February 14, 1962]. In 1971, some U.K. professionals were accepted by the OECCA,
but the following year, another candidate was rejected. The report on the meeting
of the OECCA board that discussed the rejected candidate’s application mentions
intense discussions on the subject of “tolerated professionals,”presumably referring to the Anglo-American accounting firms.
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This opposition was not only a nationalist reaction, it was also a
reflection of what perhaps could be labeled as a more traditional
view of the accounting profession. Jean Sigaut, president of the
CNCC between 1975 and 1979, for example, considered both the
Anglo-American firms and large French firms, such as the Fiduciaire de France and La Villeguérin (a multiservice firm), to be
breaking professional rules with respect to combining statutory
audits and advisory services.
A number of measures were taken that made it more difficult for the Anglo-American firms to grow. Auditors could only
practice as commissaire under a French name. This was a serious handicap for the international firms since the use of their
international trademarks would have given them a significant
ownership advantage over lesser-known competitors [Boddewyn
et al., 1986, p. 50]. Some of them, such as Arthur Andersen,
tried to register under French names. Others were registered
as “foreigners” and prevented from conducting statutory audits
[interview 3]. A second measure that acted in fact as a barrier
to Anglo-American firms was a ban on publicity. In 1984, adver
tising was allowed for audit firms in the U.K. [La Profession
Comptable, November 1984], leading to a multitude of advertisements in such newspapers as The Financial Times. It was
followed by debates in France because the liberal U.K. policy
created distortions in the market as the continental branches
of the international audit firms obviously profited from those
campaigns.8 Third, the regulation on accepting trainees stated
that one could spend only one year of the three years of traineeship in a foreign firm to become qualified for membership in
professional organizations [Aubin, 1982, §111]. One of the consequences of this limitation was that a number of professionals
from the Anglo-American firms moved to large French firms.
One of our respondents cited the case of approximately ten
promising, young auditors who left Peat Marwick, were hired by
Mazars for their training period, and remained there afterwards
[interview 1].
The limitations on combining different types of services
were supposed to prove more cumbersome to the Anglo-American firms. As a consequence of disciplinary actions, these
firms created separate entities for each of their activities. Peat
Marwick, for example, created PMM France (consultancy), Audit
Continental (accounting), Agence Juridique et Fiscale (law), and
SCP Claude Briollay (auditing) [Aubin, 1982, §113.] However, the
8

Advertising for audit firms was only allowed in France in 2005.
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French State, had it really wanted to, could have done more to
limit the expansion of the international audit firms. It did not
prosecute the international firms for violating conflict-of-interest
regulations, probably because the CNCC never initiated legal
actions on these issues. Jean Sigaut, president of the CNCC,
declared at the general meeting of the Compagnie Régionale des
Commissaires aux Comptes de Paris on July 10, 1979, that the
CNCC did not want to take action because that would have publicized the problems of the profession and would have damaged
the whole of the profession. Another reason was probably that
the Anglo-American firms were not alone in offering multiple
services. Large French firms such as Fiduciaire de France and
La Villeguérin did the same [IFEC Archive, IFEC General Meeting, October 23, 1971], and many sole practitioners also offered
different types of consulting to their auditing clients [CNCC
Archive, CNCC National Council, July 10, 1972; CNCC Archive,
General Meeting of the Compagnie Régionale des Commissaires
aux Comptes de Paris, July 10, 1979]. If the profession had gone
against the international firms, it would have to take action also
against local practitioners.
It seems that the professional bodies were stuck between
their traditional defense of the French profession and the need
for stronger auditing firms. René Ricol, at that time president
of the CNCC, confirmed in 1987 that the first objective of the
CNCC was to support the development of French audit firms
capable of providing services to French clients abroad [La Profession Comptable, No. 54, June 1987]. The second objective was
to provide a French identity to international firms with French
branches that would be as independent as possible from international networks. Ricol [as cited in La Profession Comptable,
No. 54, June 1987] analyzed the situation as follows:
... I am referring to the clear evolution of some major
international networks towards a federative structure,
in which strong national firms regain their independence. I continue to hope to see one or two French
audit firms capable of creating a smaller, less ambitious network that would be entirely at the service of
France. ... The real debate nowadays is for the medium
and smallsized firms who have to devise their strategy.
This choice is either a local client base, the voluntary
decision to join a federation, or a restructuring of audit
firms.
The Reaction of French Professional Associations: Professional
associations also reacted to the developments but were divided
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on the issue. Some, such as the Experts-Comptables de France
(ECF), defended the small firms; others, such as the IFEC,
favored international firms [interview 4]. An interesting initiative was the creation of the AFDA, the Association Française
pour le Développement de l’Audit (French Association for the
Development of Auditing). According to Le Nouvel Economiste
of February 15, 1982, the AFDA was a lobbying instrument,
set up by the public authorities after the election of François
Mitterand as president of France in May 1981 and the OECCA,
in order to support the large French accounting firms in their
negotiations with the French administration and those responsible for the management of the public sector. The AFDA was
supposedly introduced to stimulate the election of large French
firms as commissaire aux comptes to the detriment of the large
Anglo-American firms and the smaller French auditors [L’ExpertComptable de Demain, May 3, 1982]. The creation of the AFDA
led to diverging reactions from the profession. It was immediately criticized by a significant number of sole practitioners who
considered the AFDA to be an initiative to conquer their traditional market: “I have written that the AFDA is a scandal and I
have said it openly: the AFDA is a group of people who reserve
the business for each other” [Franc Parler, No. 33, 4th quarter,
1984, quoting J. Sigaut]. Others said that it “became a closed
group with a corporatist attitude whereas it should be an instrument to promote quality” [Franc Parler, No. 18, 2nd quarter,
1982, quoting J. Caudron], and that it was created to “reserve
part of the accounting market for a limited number of audit
firms” [L’Expert-Comptable de Demain, June 6-7, 1982, quoting
Maranchon]. However, the AFDA also had its supporters within
the profession because it could help maintain the presence of
French firms as auditors for large clients [L’Expert-Comptable de
Demain, June 6-7, 1982; Aujourd’hui et Demain, No. 7, June 15,
1982]. Guy Cosson summarized the strategic role of the AFDA
as follows: “The AFDA is not only a battle machine between the
large French firms against the large Anglo-American firms, for
the large auditing assignments; it will also (I do not dare to say
mainly) be a tool to speed up the concentration of engagements
for the large firms” [L’Expert-Comptable de Demain, October
1982]. In conclusion, the AFDA was created with the support of
a few large firms to put into place a structure capable of fighting
the Anglo-American firms by co-opting their very own methods,
such as high-quality services, a large and competent staff, and
systematic quality control. Its creation in fact confirmed that
the Anglo-American accounting firms were considered to have
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superior assets and skills that allowed them to compete successfully with local competitors [Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992].
Their superiority apparently was considered such that mimicking them seemed to have become the only viable alternative for
part of the French profession and the state.
The Importance of French Legal Joint-Audit: The co-commissariat
was another support for the traditional profession. To strengthen the protection of public savings, the August 8, 1935 decree
had forced listed companies to select at least one of their commissaires from a list maintained by the Courts of Appeal. These
auditors were selected on the basis of an examination of their
technical competency. Thirty years later, the law of July 24, 1966
maintained the obligation to have two commissaires in listed
companies and in private limited-liability companies possessing
a capital of more than five million francs. However, all commissaires had to meet the same minimum quality standards from
1966, and the introduction of the Eighth European Directive in
1984 further harmonized the level of professional competency.
This means that the original obligation to have two auditors,
one of them having a guaranteed professional competency,
became meaningless. The existing regulation was criticized by
the COB, the financial market regulating body: “The unity of the
audit methodology and of professional responsibility … seems
incompatible with collegiality” [National Assembly, Report 1526,
May 26, 1983, quoting Jacques Roger-Machart]. Industry, represented by its Paris lobbying body, the Chambre de Commerce
et d’Industrie de Paris, also criticized the regulation: “... the only
consequence of the obligation for certain companies to employ
two commissaires is that they have to pay additional fees” [CNCC
Archive, CCIP press release, April 2, 1971]. The CNCC continued
to support the co-commissariat: “... facing directors who – in
this type of companies – are often eminent personalities, the
presence of two commissaires who support each other increases
significantly the importance given to their opinions and their
capacity to resist pressure from the directors” [CNCC Archive,
Jean Sigaut, in a letter to the director of the exchequer, March
10, 1976]. Other advantages, according to CNCC officials, were
that young professionals could audit large companies with the
help of experienced commissaires and that the system generated
additional fees [CNCC Archive, letter from Roger Caumeil, president of CNCC, to Representative Roger-Machart, June 30, 1983].
Caumeil believed that the suppression of the co-commissariat
would lead to the replacement of French auditors by AngloPublished by eGrove, 2009
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American firms [CNCC Archive, letter from Roger Caumeil to
Robert Badinter, minister of justice, January 17, 1984]:
Now that we introduced the obligation to have the
consolidated financial statements audited, suppressing the co-commissariat would lead the large companies (that have international financial operations and
consequently need the signature of an international
audit firm), to keeping only the French branch of international firms as their auditor. Consequently, many
French commissaires would be eliminated and the largest companies would be audited by international firms.
The co-commissariat allowed the French auditors to
maintain their position up to now and even to increase
their market share in auditing.
Eventually, the discussions during the first half of the 1980s
maintained the co-commissariat, even though the law of March
1, 1984 focused its application on companies that published
consolidated financial statements. In conclusion, the co-commissariat was seen as a way to oppose the dominance of the
Anglo-American firms and to defend the interests of the auditors
in large companies. Eventually, also, the co-commissariat would
not be able to prevent the growing impact of the international
audit firms, which extended their impact on listed and other
large companies through mergers in the early 1990s.
GROWTH STRATEGIES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL AUDIT FIRMS
The Anglo-American firms in France followed different
growth strategies. The majority experienced internal growth
coupled with the takeover of local firms, a more efficient and
less costly strategy than creating new offices [interview 9]. Mergers with local French firms were seen as a way of overcoming
French resistance against an Anglo-American takeover [Gonthier-Besacier and Moizer, 2001].
One example is Arthur Andersen. It began its activities
in France by following clients with activities in Europe. In
December 1970, the firm abandoned its international name to
become Guy Barbier, adhering to a regulation of the OECCA that
required the use of a French name. In its early years, the firm
did not take over French accounting firms, adopting an internal growth strategy. “Local fees,” or local clients, progressively
became just as important as “referred fees,” local subsidiaries
of foreign firms that had to have the same auditor as the parent
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company abroad. Around 1980, the firm expanded its client base
to smaller companies and eventually acquired GPA (Peyronnet
Gauthier) while maintaining this company strictly separate from
its other activities. The objective of this acquisition was primarily to obtain a number of large French clients, but a group of
middle-sized clients also came on board [the Andersen story
as told by interviewee 7]. Guy Barbier also acquired Frinault
in 1987, after the former partners of that firm decided to leave
KMG (now KPMG). Other firms adopting similar strategies were
Price Waterhouse (merging with BEFEC in 1989) and Deloitte
(merging with Calan Ramolino in 1997).
With respect to their establishment outside Paris, different
strategies could be observed. Some firms, such as Arthur Andersen, remained focused on Paris for a long time as the presence
of Guy Barbier outside of Paris remained limited to Lyon. Most
other firms developed from a single Paris office only to an expanded presence throughout the country. Expansion was carried
out through associations with local firms as this approach was
seen as a more effective, less expensive growth strategy than the
creation of new offices.
A totally different strategy is exemplified by KPMG, growing
from a local firm into an international one. The origin of KPMG
France is Fiduciaire de France, created in Grenoble in 1922.
Originally, it was a legal and tax-services firm that extended its
activities to accounting only later, mainly due to the development of fiscal regulations. In 1945, the Fiduciaire de France
had established its activities all over France and split into two
different entities, the Société d’Expertise et de Commissariat aux
Comptes Fiduciaire de France and the Fiduciaire Juridique et Fiscale de France. In 1970, it started to look for foreign partners as
a consequence of the fact that its clients internationalized. The
firm then had auditing standards, a research department and
a methodology department, its own professional training organization, and a modern technology orientation. At that time,
most of its auditing activities were contractual, not leading to an
externally published opinion on financial statements. In 1979,
it joined KMG, a federation of the American firm Main, at that
time the ninth largest U.S. accounting firm, and the largest national accounting firms in The Netherlands, Germany, the U.K.,
and France. It was located in Amsterdam. In 1980, it took over
Frinault Fiduciaire, a firm that had prestigious French clients.
The KMG methodology was subsequently transferred to Frinault
Fiduciaire. KMG remained a federation, meaning that there was
a common brand, development strategy, and quality control sysPublished by eGrove, 2009
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tem, but also that local identity was respected and profits were
not shared on an international level. KPMG was created in 1986,
merging KMG and Peat Marwick Mitchell (PMM), known in
France as Audit Continental with a staff of about 200 employees.
The merged firm adopted the federative model of KMG rather
than the centralized PMM model. This resulted in individual
economic entities on a national level with a common name and
methodology. The brand KPMG Audit was created, employing
approximately 450 professionals in Paris. In 1988, KPMG Fiduciaire de France became KPMG S.A. without participating in the
capital of the international network but contributing to an international budget. In conclusion, the development of Fiduciaire de
France is the outcome of a quite specific strategy. It succeeded
in developing from a local firm into an international one, even
being part of one of the largest networks in the world. In March
2005, one of the last remaining French firms, Salustro Reydel,
decided to join the KPMG network.
The Anglo-American audit firms developed a recruitment
strategy that was significantly different from the recruitment
policy of traditional French firms. It turned out to be a major
innovation that supported the growth of the international firms.
French firms mainly recruited staff holding degrees from vocational institutions. From the end of the 1960s onwards, the international firms started hiring high-quality staff generally holding
degrees from the Grandes Ecoles management schools. This has
to be seen in the wider context following World War II referred
to above. The creation of business education along U.S. models
was considered essential to structurally embed the U.S, business
model. American institutions and organizations encouraged
the development of training programs around managementrelated issues. Schools like HEC and ESSEC in Paris played an
important role in the diffusion of new management approaches
[Djelic, 1998, p. 211]. Graduates of these schools were strongly
attracted to international accounting firms. The teaching staff of
the Grandes Ecoles strongly supported MBA and CPA qualifications, which were found in large numbers in the large AngloAmerican audit firms. Ambitious graduates were attracted by the
high salaries that these firms were willing to offer new recruits.
These salaries were systematically higher than those paid by
French firms and were complemented with permanent, systematic training and an exposure to business experience that was
well beyond mere bookkeeping. This recruitment policy resulted
in an inflow of staff capable of obtaining quickly both the French
expert-comptable qualification and an expertise in English. The
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auditors of Price Waterhouse, who prepared consolidated financial statements for Saint Gobain for the first time in 1976, had
to study Anglo-American textbooks because consolidation techniques were not part of the accounting curriculum and very few
books on the subject existed in French. Another consequence
was that staff members who left the profession quickly became
senior executives in industry and frequently called on their former employer for its services. “All those who have left us, have
fed the practice,” according to a former Andersen partner. Finally, and even more fundamentally, this recruitment policy also
resulted in a rapid “Frenchization” of the big firms. From the
end of the 1970s onwards, the partners of the Anglo-American
audit firms in France were mainly French citizens born between
1945 and 1950. Almost all the employees of these firms were
French, with degrees from the French higher education system,
and for the older ones, an expertise comptable degree. Originally,
professional bodies, the state, or French society isolated the
international firms because of their culture, their nationality,
and/or their foreign origins. The growing dominance of French
professionals in these firms made it impossible for these market
players to continue to marginalize the international firms and
made it possible for the international accounting firms to wage a
wide-scale commercial battle in the 1980s under very favorable
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of the large Anglo-American audit firms
into the French audit market was a complex process. Today,
these international firms dominate the market, and only a few
large French firms, such as Mazars, still maintain strong positions. The strategies of the international firms followed a pattern
that can be framed within the literature on the internationalization of service industries. Using the entry-mode classification
of Anderson and Gatignon [1986], their original entry strategy
was a “high-control” strategy, focusing on using expatriate staff
involved in auditing subsidiaries of foreign clients of the AngloAmerican firms. A specific audit report for the French market
was irrelevant in this context. However, this policy significantly
limited the growth potential of the Anglo-American audit firms
in France. To become larger, they had to expand their activities
to French clients as well. In most cases, they chose an externalgrowth strategy by taking over French audit firms or entering
into alliances with local partners. This reduced direct control
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over their activities in France, but it was compensated by licensing the use of brand names, common approaches, etc.
Hiring French professionals had two advantages that turned
out to be essential to the success of the Anglo-American firms.
First, from an institutional perspective, their “Frenchization”
can be seen as conforming to the roles and norms of French
society, making them more acceptable to the French establishment and making it much more difficult for traditional French
accounting bodies to protect the market for audit services. Yiu
and Makino [2002] argue that foreign entrants face significant
pressure to conform to local standards in this way, in line with
Kipping [1999], who underlined the importance of establishing
successful external and internal local networks to expand U.S.
consulting companies in Western Europe. We go further and
state that the “Frenchization” of the international firms was
a key success factor for them. Second, the educational background of these French professionals made it possible for the
Anglo-American firms to profile their services as being of significantly higher quality than the local standard. Consequently, they
became similar to the French service providers, but they could
also maintain an image of higher-quality service providers.
Agarwal and Ramaswami [1992] considered superiority of assets
and skills as a precondition to compete successfully with local
service providers. Indeed, the superiority of their assets, their
larger size, and their differentiated products both within and
around the audit industry made it difficult for the local firms to
compete and explains why they became dominant despite their
wide institutional distance.
The international audit firms strongly influenced the way
audits are carried out in France. Their methodology was transferred to French audit firms by auditors trained in the large
international firms but continuing their careers in local firms.
This strengthened large local firms, which could start competing with the international firms to gain large clients. These local
firms were helped by the French system of co-commissariat joint
audit [Piot, 2001]. However, it is doubtful whether these large
French firms will continue to play an important role for much
longer. The recent integration of Salustro-Reydel, one of the
two largest French audit firms, into KPMG illustrates this trend.
Increased competition in the market of larger clients also led to
recent attempts to increase the market share of the international
audit firms in the market of small and medium-sized clients,
eventually affecting the whole audit market structure. The traditional audit markets became saturated as both international
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol36/iss1/4
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and local firms expanded into new types of assurance services
and into new markets. This development was interrupted in the
post-Enron era when the corporate scandals that shocked the financial markets at the start of the 21st century shifted the focus
back to conflicts of interest and auditor independence. On the
European level, some basic rules of the game were rewritten in
the new Eighth Directive, and France introduced a new supervisory structure and regulation of the financial markets. To a large
extent, these changes are taking place now, but their effects will
only be seen in the future. It will be interesting to observe how
professional structures will reflect these changes and whether
they will lead to the renewal of a debate that was essential in
shaping the French profession a quarter century ago.
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APPENDIX A
List of the Ten Interviewees
Interviewee 1

former member of the Conseil Supérieur de l’Ordre
des Experts- Comptables; former president of the
Commission des Diligences Normales of the OEC;
created a small firm that became one of the largest
independent French audit firms

Interviewee 2

former president of the Conseil Supérieur de l’Ordre
des Experts- Comptables; former partner in a small
audit firm

Interviewee 3

former general secretary of the CNCC; moved from
a large Anglo-American firm to create his own
small firm

Interviewee 4

former general secretary of the CNCC

Interviewee 5

former president of the CNCC; former partner in a
mid-sized French firm

Interviewee 6

former president of the CNCC; former partner in a
small French firm

Interviewee 7

responsible for accounting resources at the COB
(AMF)

Interviewee 8

partner of an Anglo-American audit firm

Interviewee 9

partner of an Anglo-American audit firm

Interviewee 10

university professor
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